Tag: CVE

  • The Rundown: CVE IDs, Meanings, & Assumptions

    For almost two decades, CVE has been considered an industry standard for vulnerability tracking. A CVE ID can be affiliated with many vulnerabilities, in a format like CVE-2014-54321. Note my choice in ID, from 2014 with a consecutive set of numbers. That is because I specifically chose a ‘sample’ CVE that was set aside as…

  • SolarWinds: Sitting on Undisclosed Vulnerabilities

    SolarWinds: Sitting on Undisclosed Vulnerabilities

    [This was originally published on RiskBasedSecurity.com.] SolarWinds was in the news last year, as the victim of an attack that compromised its Orion Platform software by inserting a backdoor into it, allowing for remote code execution. This attack has had an incredible impact on the security industry and recently, interest in the SolarWinds breach has…

  • Redscan’s Curious Comments About Vulnerabilities

    Redscan’s Curious Comments About Vulnerabilities

    As a connoisseur of vulnerability disclosures and avid vulnerability collector, I am always interested in analysis of the disclosure landscape. That typically comes in the form of reports that analyze a data set (e.g. CVE/NVD) and draw conclusions. This seems straight-forward but it isn’t. I have written about the varied problems with such analysis many…

  • The Value of Backfilling

    The Value of Backfilling

    [This was originally published on RiskBasedSecurity.com.] In every quarterly Vulnerability QuickView Report, we include a chart that shows how many vulnerabilities were disclosed so far that year, along with the most current counts of prior periods to show relative growth and decline.  In some cases, like this year’s Q1, that chart shows a decline compared…

  • A critique of the summary of “Latent Feature Vulnerability Rankings of CVSS Vectors”

    A critique of the summary of “Latent Feature Vulnerability Rankings of CVSS Vectors”

    Update: Corren McCoy has written a wonderful response to this blog where she goes into more detail about her conclusions as well as citing more portions of the original research that led to her conclusions. As she notes, there are several layers of condensing the original research at play here, which can dilute and distort…

  • Not all CVEs are Created Equal. Or even valid…

    Not all CVEs are Created Equal. Or even valid…

    [I wrote this early 2019 and it was scheduled for January 7 but it apparently did not actually publish and then got lost in my excessive drafts list. I touched it up this week to publish because the example that triggered this blog is old but the response is evergreen. Apologies for the long delay!]…

  • More authorities, more CVEs; Oh, and more commentary.

    More authorities, more CVEs; Oh, and more commentary.

    On November 10, TechBeacon published a great article by Rob Lemos titled “More authorities, more CVEs: What it means for app sec teams” in which I was quoted, along with several other people. Like many articles of this nature, those who provide input often will talk for as long as half an hour and ultimately…

  • “The History of CVE” and A Couple of Objections

    “The History of CVE” and A Couple of Objections

    I just read “The History of Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE)” by Ary Widdes from Tripwire and found it to be a great summary of the 20+ years of the program. I say that as an outspoken CVE and MITRE critic even! I do have a couple of objections however, with the conclusion, and then…

  • Why Anaconda INC Doesn’t Fully Understand CVEs

    Why Anaconda INC Doesn’t Fully Understand CVEs

    It’s worrisome that in 2020 we still have people in influential technical roles that don’t understand CVE. A friend told me earlier this year he was in a meeting where someone said that CVE IDs are assigned in order, so CVE-2020-9500 meant there were 9500 vulns in 2020 so far. Of course that is not…

  • Disclosure Repair Timelines?

    Disclosure Repair Timelines?

    For those in InfoSec, you have probably seen a vulnerability disclosure timeline. Part of that often includes the researcher’s interaction with the vendor including the vulnerability being fixed. After the issue is disclosed, the story typically ends there. Every so often, work needs to be done after that to ‘repair’ part of the disclosure. For…