2019-02-14 Update: Thanks to Chris Mills @ MSRC (@TheChrisAM), who has been working behind the scenes since this blog was published, he has brought clarity to these assignments! MSRC is still potentially touching up some additional documentation to make it easier to see these associations, but here is the definitive answer from him:
CVE-2017-0143 ShadowBrokers : EternalSynergy (Blog)
CVE-2017-0145 ShadowBrokers : EternalRomance (Blog)
CVE-2017-0144 ShadowBrokers : EternalBlue (Blog)
CVE-2017-0146 ShadowBrokers : EternalChampion (Blog)
Note that only the EternalChampion blog does not reference the associated CVE, but he is working on getting that updated. I have also recommended that MSRC update MS17-010 to use the codenames in that advisory as well. Apparently editing the actual bulletins takes a bit more work, but he’s on it! I can’t thank Chris enough for running with this and helping bring clarity to these assignments.
There was initially a lot of confusion over the Equation Group disclosure. Which were legitimate vulnerabilities, which were new, which were known, which were patched, and ultimately how they would be referred to other than their leaked nicknames. That is the purpose of The Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures project (originally Common Vulnerability Enumeration), to give a unique ID to a specific issue so that you can reference a vulnerability without question. A year and a half later? We’re still wondering apparently.
I contacted Microsoft Security Response Center (MSRC) on August 6, 2017 asking for clarification on the CVE assignment for one of the Equation Group vulnerabilities codenamed ETERNALBLUE, because their own resources contradicted each other. From my mail:
Per an older blog [1], the vulnerability known as ‘EternalBlue’ is assigned CVE-2017-0145. From the blog:
However, in this unique case, the ransomware perpetrators used
publicly available exploit code for the patched SMB “EternalBlue”
vulnerability, CVE-2017-0145, which can be triggered by sending a
specially crafted packet to a targeted SMBv1 server.A newer blog [2] now lists it as CVE-2017-0144, which I believe to be incorrect. From the blog:
The new ransomware can also spread using an exploit for the Server
Message Block (SMB) vulnerability CVE-2017-0144 (also known as
EternalBlue), which was fixed in security update MS17-010 and was
also exploited by WannaCrypt to spread to out-of-date machines.Can you confirm the correct assignment for ‘EternanBlue’ [sic], and due to the second blog, the assignment for ‘EternalRomance’, and update your blog(s) accordingly?
All this time later? MSRC never answered my mail, and never fixed one of the two blogs. CVE’s description of each does not mention the nickname in either entry. So the assigning CVE Numbering Authority (Microsoft), or CNA, and the core CVE project (MITRE) still don’t answer this question. To date, the Microsoft advisories for those two CVE ID still don’t mention the nickname. To add more confusion? Try using Google to find it, and you get a third CVE ID it may be (screenshot below). Although, that one result doesn’t actually have ‘EternalBlue’ in it, making us wonder why it is the sole result. The blog that MSRC originally published to add some clarity to the Equation Group still only references MS17-010 (and a dead link now). Looking at the new location for MS17-010 doesn’t find the nickname in the advisory either.
To this day, I am still fairly sure ETERNABLUE is CVE-2017-0145 and attribute it as such, but it sure would be nice if MSRC would clean up and clarify this mess.
Further, I have had to chase down two more errant CVE assignments by MSRC in the last months, which was fairly painful. After getting the runaround on both, being told to go ask Microsoft Support via a forum (despite MSRC being the definitive source for this information), not getting a reply, opening a new ticket with MSRC, reminding them that I was still waiting… those two finally got resolved after a month or more. I really don’t like casting shade on MSRC as over the years, in total, they have been wonderful to deal with. However, the last couple of years have seen a serious decline in this type of incident which should be ‘Vulnerability 101’, and a serious uptick in their resistance to clarify assignments when asked. Finally, if you are wondering why MITRE doesn’t provide some kind of oversight to this? Well they basically never have despite repeated requests for just that. Their only oversight is a ‘CNA Report Card’ that is more about statistics of assignments and such, and does not deal with the quality of assignments, incidents of confusion like this, or anything else that would be helpful to the community.
The only upside to all of this? I got to [sic] my own typo from the quoted email.